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Policymakers have long viewed tax policy as an instrument 
to influence and change corporate governance practices. Certain tax 
rules were enacted to discourage pyramidal business structures and 
large golden parachutes, and to encourage performance-based com-
pensation. Other proposals, such as imposing higher taxes on exces-
sive executive compensation, have also attracted increasing attention. 
 Contrary to this view, this Article contends that the ability 
to effectively mitigate corporate governance inefficiencies through 
the use of corrective taxes is very limited, and that these taxes may 
cause more harm than benefit. There are a few reasons for the limited 
effectiveness of corrective taxes. Importantly, the same conditions 
that give rise to corporate governance problems also undermine the 
effectiveness of corrective taxes. Poorly governed firms are more likely 
to incur a higher tax without changing their practices that benefit 
their managers. Where the same corporate governance practices 
are harmful in some situations and beneficial in others, imposing 
tax is unlikely to be optimal. Corrective taxes are unlikely to be 
superior to other forms of regulation where the legislature knows 
what governance terms are optimal, or where the legislature can-
not assess the negative externalities. 
 This Article also examines the effects of general tax rules on 
corporate governance. The impact of general tax rules and correc-
tive taxes on corporate governance should be carefully considered 
when designing a tax reform. 
                                                                                                                        
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong. I am grateful to Louis Kaplow, Kobi Kastiel, Stephen Shay, John Vella, 
Alvin Warren, and the participants of the 2017 symposium of the Oxford Uni-
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INTRODUCTION 
 Policymakers have long viewed tax policy as an instrument 
to influence and change corporate governance practices. Certain 
tax rules were enacted to discourage pyramidal business structures1 
and large golden parachutes,2 and to encourage performance-
based compensation.3 Other proposals, such as imposing higher 
taxes on excessive executive compensation, have also attracted 
increasing attention.4 
 Contrary to that view, this Article contends that the ability 
to effectively mitigate corporate governance problems and increase 
efficiency through the use of corrective taxes is very limited. The 
existing corrective taxes should be reconsidered, and in certain cases 
revoked and replaced with other more efficient forms of regulation. 
 The relevant tax rules can be divided into two groups. The 
first group consists of corrective taxes that aim to encourage or 
discourage a specific behavior or practice, such as the rules con-
cerning the taxation of intercompany dividends, golden parachutes, 
and nonperformance-based compensation, discussed below. The 
second group consists of general taxes that were imposed to raise 
tax revenues, such as corporate, dividend, and individual taxes, 
which do not directly aim to influence corporate practices. The 
impact of both groups of taxes on corporate governance should be 
carefully considered when designing a corporate tax reform. 
 The Roosevelt administration in the 1930s enacted taxation 
on intercorporate dividends in order to break pyramidal business 
groups.5 Some other tax rules aim to limit certain kinds of execu-
tive compensation. For example, section 162(m) tries to discourage 
high levels of compensation, which are not linked to performance, 
by disallowing the deduction of nonperformance-based compensa-
tion expenses exceeding $1 million, granted to a top executive of 
                                                                                                                        
1 See Randall Morck, How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The 
Double Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax 
Policy, 19 TAX POL'Y ECON. 135 (2005). 
2 See I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999. Unless specified otherwise, all references to sec-
tions are to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) of 1986, as amended. 
3 Id. § 162(m). 
4 See David I. Walker, A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem, 93 
B.U.L. REV. 326, 346 (2013). 
5 See Morck, supra note 1, at 148–58. 
2017] CAN TAXES MITIGATE? 225 
a publicly held firm.6 Tax penalties apply to large executive com-
pensation packages granted in connection with a change in con-
trol (“golden parachutes”): the compensation paid to executives is 
subject to an additional tax of 20 percent and is not deductible to 
the firm.7 
 In addition to these tax rules, there are proposals for using 
corrective taxes to mitigate corporate agency costs. One sugges-
tion is to impose a surtax on executive compensation above a cer-
tain threshold in public firms, combined with a tax relief to the 
investors equal to the surtax paid by the executives.8 This Article 
discusses that proposal and two other proposals for corrective 
taxes on related-party transactions and on anti-takeover devices. 
 Several factors limit the effectiveness of corrective taxation 
in mitigating corporate governance inefficiencies. First, the same 
conditions that gave rise to the agency problem also undermine 
the effectiveness of corrective taxes. Firms with better governance 
are more likely to alter their practices in response to a corrective 
tax, whereas firms with worse governance are more likely to incur 
the tax penalty without changing their practices.9 Managers in 
poorly governed firms are more likely to shift the tax burden onto 
the firm without changing the practices that benefit the managers. 
The experience with many firms deciding to adopt nonperfor-
mance-based compensation and golden parachutes that trigger 
tax penalties indicate that taxation might not be an effective 
means of changing practices in poorly governed firms.10 Therefore, 
unlike negative externalities that can be internalized through cor-
rective taxation, corporate agency problems might not be effec-
tively countered through the use of taxation, because the same 
                                                                                                                        
6 § 162(m). 
7 Id. §§ 280G, 4999(a). 
8 See Walker, supra note 4, at 346. 
9 David M. Schizer, Tax and Corporate Governance: The Influence of Tax on 
Managerial Agency Costs, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE 1, 13 (Jeffrey Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2015) questions the 
effectiveness of penalizing firms for practices that benefit managers (“ … if 
managers really put their own interests ahead of the firm, as this regime assumes, 
why would a tax penalty on the firm deter them?”). This Article contends that 
this problem is greater in firms with worse governance where the managers 
are more likely to succeed in putting their own interests ahead of the firm.  
10 See infra Part II.  
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conditions that gave rise to the agency problem might undermine 
the effectiveness of corrective taxes. 
 Second, where the tax is imposed on the managers, shifting 
the tax burden onto the firms, in whole or in part, would reduce 
their benefit and the overall efficiency gain from imposing a cor-
rective tax.11 From the shareholders’ standpoint, a tax would be 
beneficial if it reduces the firm’s agency costs to an extent exceed-
ing the tax burden shifted onto the firm. Shareholders might also 
benefit when the increase in tax revenue results in a decrease in 
other taxes. From a broader efficiency perspective, corporate agency 
costs reduce investment in the corporate sector and distort the 
allocation of capital.12 If some of the corrective tax were borne by 
the firm, it would reduce the social benefit from that corrective tax. 
 Third, the same corporate governance practices might be 
harmful in some situations and beneficial in others. If these prac-
tices were uniformly harmful, a prohibition would be desirable, but 
it might be suboptimal to ban practices where the effect is mixed.13 
Imposing a tax that discourages the harmful uses of a particular 
practice would discourage beneficial uses as well.14 Golden para-
chutes encourage managers to find beneficial sales, and help in 
overcoming managerial entrenchment, although they might lead 
to harmful changes in control.15 Some related-party transactions 
might be used for tunneling, as discussed below, whereas others 
                                                                                                                        
11 See Walker, supra note 4, at 368–69. 
12 See id. at 336. 
13 For a general discussion on the differences between regulatory prohibi-
tions, liability rules and corrective taxes, see Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1700 (2011); Schizer, supra note 9, at 2 (“Tax also is a 
poor fit because it typically applies mandatorily and uniformly, while responses to 
agency cost should be molded to the context. For example, promoting stock op-
tions or leverage will be valuable in some settings, but disastrous in others.”). 
14 See Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. 
L. REV. 1673 (2015). Fleischer argues that corrective taxation is unlikely to be 
efficient where the negative externality from a certain activity varies signifi-
cantly across the different agents that engage in that activity. In analogy, see 
Giorgia Maffini & John Vella, Evidence-based Policy Making? The Commis-
sion’s Proposal for an FTT 20 (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, 
WP 15/15, 2015) (“[M]ore generally, the [Financial Transaction Tax] does not 
discriminate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ transactions, and so whilst it might act 
as a disincentive for transactions that do not enhance market efficiency it will 
also act as a disincentive for transactions that do.”). 
15 See infra Section II.B.  
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might increase the firm’s value.16 Anti-takeover arrangements 
might be used by an underperforming management to entrench 
itself, whereas the same measures may assist an excellent man-
agement against harmful bids that could destroy the firm’s long-
term value.17 Strengthening other mechanisms that can distinguish 
between harmful and beneficial applications, and allowing only 
the latter ones, might be superior to taxation. 
 Fourth, the tax system is limited in its ability to assess real 
risk and performance goals. The tax penalty under section 162(m) 
could be easily avoided, and the deferral under section 83 could 
be easily received, by granting compensation conditioned on eas-
ily attainable performance targets.18 The tax authorities’ limited 
ability to assess these factors raises doubts about the effectiveness 
of using tax rules to incentivize pay-for-performance compensa-
tion schemes that actually reward good managerial performance. 
Strengthening corporate governance mechanisms, such as board 
and shareholders’ approval processes for executive compensation 
packages, may be superior to using the tax system for incentiviz-
ing adopting performance-based compensation schemes. 
 Fifth, taxation might not have many advantages over other 
forms of regulation in mitigating corporate governance inefficien-
cies. If the government knows what the best governance terms 
are, command and control regulation is preferable.19 Taxation 
would be preferable where the government does not know which 
governance terms are optimal, but can assess the externalities 
generated by the relevant behaviors and practices, and can im-
pose a tax equal to these externalities.20 With respect to pyrami-
dal business groups, the case for limiting this practice through a 
ban is more compelling. The harm caused by these structures is 
well documented, whereas it is hard to impose a corrective tax 
equal to the externality induced by each layer of the pyramid.21 
Nonetheless, in respect of some other corporate governance prac-
tices, there is a significant difficulty on both ends: it is hard to 
                                                                                                                        
16 See infra Section II.E.  
17 See infra Section II.F. 
18 See infra Section II.A.  
19 See Richard M. Hynes, Taxing Control, 38 J. CORP. L. 567, 581–83 (2013). 
20 See id. 
21 See infra Section II.C. 
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determine what the optimal corporate governance practice is, and 
it is also hard to design a tax equal to the negative externality 
from each practice. Unlike a ban on a particular practice, a tax 
allows an action to take place if the benefit exceeds the cost of the 
tax.22 A tax would allow an action to take place where the benefit 
from a particular action exceeds the tax, whereas a ban would 
prevent any action regardless of the size of the benefit.23 However, 
if insiders, and not the firm, receive the benefit while the firm is 
harmed from that action, the firm would be better off under a reg-
ulation forbidding that action. In addition, it may be more politi-
cally feasible to adopt a tax rather than a ban. An alternative to 
taxation and command and control regulation is to strengthen 
mechanisms, both internal and external, that can distinguish be-
tween harmful and beneficial applications of the relevant corporate 
governance practices, and allow only the latter ones. 
 General tax rules, discussed in the third part of this Article, 
are not corrective taxes in their essence because they do not aim 
to encourage or discourage a particular activity or behavior. None-
theless, they have a significant influence on corporate governance. 
These effects should be taken into account when designing corpo-
rate and dividend tax rules. Lowering tax rates while increasing 
enforcement efforts might improve corporate governance.24 In ad-
dition, it may be more efficient to use a corporate income tax rather 
than a dividend tax as a source of revenue because the former 
creates fewer distortions.25 Although dividend taxes reduce the 
dividend payment level and worsen corporate governance, a cer-
tain level of tax on dividend distribution to individuals is needed 
to provide them with an incentive to invest through tax-exempt 
institutional investors, such as pension funds, which can mitigate 
the collective action problem and improve monitoring.26 
                                                                                                                        
22 For a general discussion on the differences between taxes and regulatory 
prohibitions, see Kelly, supra note 13, at 1700. 
23 See id. 
24 See Mihir A. Desai, Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Theft and Taxes, 
84 J. FIN. ECON. 591 (2007). 
25 See Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, Dividend and Corporate Taxation in 
an Agency Model of the Firm, 2 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 1, 14 (2010). 
26 See Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Dividend Taxation and Corporate 
Governance, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 164 (2005). 
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 Certain individual income tax rules also have a significant 
influence on the quality of corporate governance.27 The Tax Code 
creates an incentive to receive deferred compensation in stock op-
tions and restricted stocks that are conditioned on meeting some 
performance requirements, as the tax on these forms of compen-
sation is easily deferred.28 The resulting effect on corporate gov-
ernance is unclear. Although this form of compensation better 
aligns the managers’ incentives with those of the shareholders, it 
fails to incentivize the adoption of performance-based compensa-
tion; this is because easily achievable performance goals satisfy 
the requirements for deferral under this tax rule.29 Moreover, 
higher equity-based compensation does not necessarily substitute 
for other forms of compensation.30 In addition, the tax rule regard-
ing working condition fringe benefits encourages granting more 
costly perks.31 This might be problematic from a corporate gover-
nance standpoint because these perks are not subject to the same 
reporting and approval procedures as executive compensation.32 
 The complexity of the Tax Code could be used to disguise 
earnings manipulations and tunneling. Thus, simplifying and 
harmonizing tax rules can eliminate tunneling opportunities and 
improve monitoring and transparency.33 Other tax rules that 
might influence the quality of the corporate governance include 
the rules that affect the decision where to incorporate and the 
rules that influence financing choices between debt and equity.34 
 Although this Article focuses on the effect of taxation on cor-
porate governance, it is important to note that corporate governance 
practices and characteristics influence taxation.35 The effect of cor-
porate governance on taxation is also a relevant factor to be con-
sidered when evaluating the tax system and possible reforms.36 
                                                                                                                        
27 See infra Section III.C. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See id.  
31 See id.  
32 See id.  
33 See Schizer, supra note 9, at 27–28; Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 
Tax and Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach, in TAX AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 13, 27 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2008). 
34 See infra Part III.  
35 See infra Part IV. 
36 See id. 
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There is evidence which shows that a higher level of incentive 
compensation is associated with an increased level of tax avoid-
ance, especially among firms with better corporate governance.37 
The ownership structure also affects the level of tax avoidance, as 
family-owned firms and firms with dual class stock structure have 
a lower level of tax avoidance, whereas firms in which private eq-
uity (PE) and hedge funds have large holdings show higher levels 
of tax avoidance.38 In addition, firms might also overpay taxes 
when trying to disguise fraud in reporting inflated earnings.39 These 
findings might indicate that eliminating tax-avoidance opportu-
nities would have a stronger effect on firms with higher levels of 
incentive compensation and on firms held by PE and hedge funds. 
A tax reform that would reduce tax avoidance opportunities, reduce 
corporate and dividend taxes, and increase enforcement efforts, 
could possibly improve corporate governance for firms with weak 
governance, and provide well-governed firms with stronger incen-
tives to focus more on real improvement in performance rather 
than on enhancing tax efficiency. 
 The structure of the remaining parts of this Article is as 
follows. The first part reviews the main relevant corporate agency 
problems that corrective taxes aim to address, namely, entrench-
ment and tunneling, and it also discusses the efficiency conse-
quences of corporate agency costs. The second part explores the 
use of corrective taxation to reduce corporate agency costs. The 
third part explores the effects of general tax rules on corporate 
governance, and how these rules can be used to reduce corporate 
agency costs. The fourth part identifies the effects of corporate 
governance practices and characteristics that may affect taxation.  
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INEFFICIENCIES 
A. Overview of the Relevant Agency Problems 
 The agency problem is central to the intersection of taxation 
and corporate governance.40 Where a wholly owned corporation that 
is managed by a sole shareholder avoids tax, it does not have any 
                                                                                                                        
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See id.  
40 See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 14. 
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consequences on its corporate governance. This tax avoidance 
merely diverts resources from the state to the shareholder.41 A 
meaningful intersection of taxation and corporate governance ap-
pears where an agency problem exists.42 The research on this in-
tersection identifies whether the tax system mitigates or aggravates 
corporate governance agency problems.43 
The main relevant categories of corporate governance agency 
problems are managerial entrenchment and tunneling. Manage-
rial entrenchment occurs where managers make it impractical or 
very costly for shareholders to replace them.44 In general, not tax-
ing the nonpecuniary benefits of control would increase the entre-
preneurs’ incentives to retain control beyond the socially optimal 
level.45 Managers can use anti-takeover devices, such as poison 
pills, to insulate themselves from the risk of being replaced.46 
Managers therefore have an incentive to entrench themselves to 
prevent a takeover that might result in their replacement, even if 
this takeover is beneficial for the shareholders. If managers can 
counter the disciplinary force of the market for corporate control 
and entrench themselves, it would cause suboptimal managerial 
incentives because the managers are not exposed to the risk of 
being replaced for underperformance.47 In cases where managers 
hold a large stake of the firm’s cash flow rights, they will still have 
incentives to maximize the value of the firm even if they are en-
trenched.48 The incentive problem would be greater where man-
agers hold fewer equity rights because their interests are not 
aligned with the shareholders’ interest and do not provide adequate 
incentives to maximize the firm’s value.49 
                                                                                                                        
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The 
Case of Manager-Specific Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 126 (1989). 
45 See Hynes, supra note 19, at 581. 
46 For a general discussion on the reasons why firms adopt antitakeover 
arrangements, see Lucian Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 
152 U. PENN. L. REV. 713 (2003).  
47 See Bebchuk, infra note 174, at 7. 
48 See id. at 11. 
49 See id. 
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 Tunneling occurs where resources are transferred out of a 
firm to its managers or controllers.50 Atanasov et al. use a taxonomy 
that divides tunneling into three basic types: cash flow tunneling, 
asset tunneling and equity tunneling.51 Cash flow tunneling is de-
fined as a transfer of a portion of the current year’s cash flow, 
without affecting the firm’s long-term assets.52 One important 
form of cash flow tunneling involves price manipulation: the firm 
might buy inputs from insiders at a price higher than market 
value, or sell outputs to them at a price below market value.53 
Another significant form of cash flow tunneling involves excessive 
executive compensation and excessive spending on perks.54 
 Asset tunneling involves the transfer of significant, produc-
tive, long-term assets from the firm, or to the firm, for a price dif-
ferent from the fair market value.55 It usually involves self-dealing 
transactions in which an insider sells overpriced assets to the 
firm, or buys assets from the firm for a price below the fair value.56 
One common form of asset tunneling is to make an investment in 
an affiliated company in terms that outside investors would not 
accept.57 Intangible assets can be used for this kind of tunneling, 
as it is difficult for minority shareholders to prove that the price 
is unfair.58 Asset tunneling includes many tunneling practices, 
such as investing in a troubled affiliate, repurchasing of shares 
from insiders for a price above the market value, and providing 
intellectual property rights to related parties at a discount or buy-
ing rights from them at a premium.59 
 Equity tunneling involves an increase in the insider’s share 
of the firm at the expense of the outside shareholders, without 
changing the firm’s assets or cash flow.60 This kind of tunneling 
                                                                                                                        
50 See Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Law and 
Tunneling, 37(1) J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2011). 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. at 6?7. 
54 See id. at 7. 
55 See Atanasov et al., supra note 50, at 5. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 7?8. 
58 See id. at 8. 
59 See id. at 7–8. The distinction between cash flow and asset tunneling 
might not be convincing because cash is not different from other assets. 
60 See Atanasov et al., supra note 50, at 8?9. 
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includes various forms, such as dilutive equity offerings in which 
shares or stock options are offered to insiders for below the market 
value, freezeouts for less than the stock’s fair market value, sale 
of control without offering to buy minority shares, repurchases of 
insiders’ shares for more than the fair value, and excessive equity-
based executive compensation.61 Some transactions involve more 
than one type of tunneling.62  
B. The Efficiency Consequences of Managerial Agency Costs 
 Although it is commonly assumed that managerial agency 
costs are borne by shareholders, this assumption is questionable, 
especially in the long run.63 An analogy can be drawn between the 
incidence of corporate income taxation and managerial agency 
costs, as both can be thought of as taxes on the return from an 
investment in corporate equity.64 If the incidences of corporate in-
come tax and systematic agency costs are similar, then a large 
share of the burden of the corporate agency costs is likely to be 
borne in the long run by immobile factors, such as noncorporate 
capital and labor.65 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated 
that in the long run 75 percent of corporate income taxes are borne 
by capital owners, and 25 percent are borne by domestic labor.66 
In many cases, shareholders can observe agency costs, ei-
ther directly or indirectly through a lower rate of return.67 When 
shareholders and potential investors can predict the agency costs 
and the lower return, they would reduce their investment and 
shift their capital to other investment channels.68 If capital is 
shifted out of the public company sector onto other sectors because 
                                                                                                                        
61 See id. at 9. 
62 See id. at 7. 
63 See David I. Walker, Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compen-
sation (and Other Corporate Agency Costs)?, 57 VILL. L. REV. 653, 654 (2012). 
64 See id.  
65 See id. at 666. 
66 See Joint Committee on Taxation, Modeling the Distribution of Taxes on 
Business Income 4 (2013), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown 
&id=4528 [https://perma.cc/3T4R-G2MU]. 
67 See Walker, supra note 63, at 664–66. 
68 See id. at 661–62. 
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of agency costs, it would distort the efficient capital allocation in 
the market and reduce social welfare.69 
 The argument for regulation would be more compelling if 
corporate governance inefficiencies have significant implications on 
overall social welfare and various third parties.70 From a distrib-
utive perspective, a transfer of wealth from shareholders to execu-
tives might not be perceived as too problematic, whereas imposing 
costs on labor is likely to prompt more governmental intervention.71 
II. USING CORRECTIVE TAXES TO MITIGATE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE INEFFICIENCIES 
 The discussion below analyzes the current use of corrective 
taxation in the contexts of performance-based compensation, golden 
parachutes, and pyramidal business groups. It also examines po-
tential uses of taxation in the contexts of executive compensation, 
related party transactions, and anti-takeover devices.72 
In general, corrective taxes and subsidies aim to encourage 
or discourage a specific behavior or practice.73 According to the 
economic theory, an optimal corrective tax or subsidy should 
                                                                                                                        
69 See id. at 669. 
70 See id. at 671–72. 
71 See id. at 670–71. 
72 There is a question in the corporate governance literature whether pri-
vate ordering can mitigate corporate governance inefficiencies: whether share-
holders can resolve these problems on their own, without any regulation or 
governmental intervention. The supporters of regulation contend that share-
holders alone cannot successfully mitigate many corporate governance ineffi-
ciencies because of various reasons: individual shareholders of widely held 
companies are uninformed and suffer from a collective action problem, and are 
therefore unable to effectively monitor managerial actions; institutional inves-
tors also suffer from inadequate incentives, conflict of interests, and regulatory 
constraints that impede their ability to act like real owners. See, e.g., Lucian 
A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 
BUS. LAW. 329, 335–36 (2010); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: the 
Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 812, 813 (1992); Marcel 
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1048 (2007). In general, contractual problems 
of adverse selection, moral hazard, and incompleteness limit the effectiveness 
of contract-based private ordering. 
73 See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920) and 
the extensive literature on corrective (Pigovian) taxes and subsidies.  
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equal the marginal external social cost or benefit.74 Many countries 
have adopted various corrective taxes, such as taxes on gasoline, 
carbon emissions, and alcohol and tobacco products.75 Many coun-
tries have also introduced corrective subsidies, usually in the form of 
tax benefits, to incentivize particular behaviors, activities and in-
vestments, such as charitable donations, retirement savings, re-
search and development activities, and foreign direct investments.76 
A. Encouraging Performance-Based Compensation 
1. The Rationale for Encouraging Performance-Based  
Compensation 
 At the beginning of the 1990s, prominent economists urged 
shareholders to support large pay packages that would provide 
high-powered incentives.77 According to their view, shareholders 
should be more concerned about providing the managers with suf-
ficiently strong incentives than about the size of the executive 
compensation.78 In theory, performance-based compensation should 
align the interests of the managers with those of the shareholders, 
and provide managers with incentives to maximize the firm’s value.79 
 The empirical evidence indicates that cash compensation, in-
cluding bonuses, is weakly correlated with firms’ industry-adjusted 
performance.80 Less salient forms of non-equity compensation, 
such as pension benefits, loans and other perks, are also insensi-
tive to managerial performance.81 Equity-based compensation 
can provide managers with the desirable incentives.82 However, 
                                                                                                                        
74 See LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 
212–13 (2008).  
75 For a discussion on different kinds of corrective taxes, see Fleischer, supra 
note 14, at 1700–01 (food taxes), 1703–04 (environmental taxes), 1706–08 (to-
bacco and alcohol taxes), and throughout that article.  
76 For a discussion on corrective subsidies, see Fleischer, supra note 14, at 
1681, 1685, 1709–10.  
77 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and 
Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 226 (1990). 
78 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6 (2004). 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 7. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
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according to Bebchuk and Fried, managers frequently use their 
influence to receive large benefits from equity-based compensa-
tion even when their performance is poor.83 For example, a large 
majority of firms grant stock options without filtering out the 
stock price rises which occur due to industry and general market 
trends, which are unrelated to the managers’ performance that 
increased the firm’s value.84 Bebchuk and Fried suggest adopting 
policies that provide managers with compensation that is truly 
based on their performance.85 In their view, institutional inves-
tors should pressure firms to use equity-based forms that filter out 
windfalls, tie compensation to the management’s performance, and 
limit the executives’ ability to unload their equity incentives.86 
2. Section 162(m) 
 Under section 162(m), a publicly held corporation cannot de-
duct compensation with respect to its CEO or its three next most 
highly compensated officers other than its CFO to the extent that the 
amount of the annual compensation paid to that executive exceeds 
$1 million.87 However, compensation that qualifies as “performance-
based compensation” can be deducted with no limitation.88 
 The performance-based compensation should be granted in 
accordance with the following requirements: the compensation 
must be paid only if the pre-established, objective performance 
goals have been achieved; a committee with two or more outside 
directors should establish the performance goals, in writing, at a 
time when the outcome is substantially uncertain, no later than 
ninety days after the beginning of the performance period, and 
not after 25 percent of the performance period has passed; whether 
the performance goals have been met should be determined by 
using objectively determinable criteria; the committee has discre-
tion to reduce compensation, but cannot increase it on a discre-
tionary basis; the material terms of the award must be disclosed 
to shareholders, who vote whether to approve them; and before 
                                                                                                                        
83 See id.  
84 See id. 
85 See id. at 10–11. 
86 See id. at 184. 
87 § 162(m)(1). 
88 Id. § 162(m)(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e). 
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granting the compensation, the committee must certify in writing 
that the performance goals have been satisfied.89 
 A special rule applies to stock options. In general, compen-
sation awarded as stock options or as stock appreciation rights is 
deemed to qualify as performance-based compensation if the com-
pensation plan is made by the abovementioned committee, the 
compensation plan states the maximum number of shares of op-
tions or rights that can be granted during a specified period to 
any executive, and the exercise price of the option is not less than 
the fair market value of a share on the date the option is granted.90 
Restricted stocks and other equity compensation forms that do 
not qualify for this special rule will not qualify as performance-
based compensation unless the general requirements under sec-
tion 162(m), listed above, are met.91 
 When section 162(m) was enacted in 1992, a compensation 
of $1 million per year was at the high end of executives’ salary 
range.92 Enacting this tax rule affected compensation schemes, as 
more firms shifted executive pay into performance-based compen-
sation plans.93 It also served as a benchmark for executives who 
earned below $1 million: they pressured their boards to increase 
their nonperformance-based compensation to $1 million.94 Conse-
quently, many firms increased their executive compensation levels.95 
It is important to note that compensation levels have increased 
significantly since the early 1990s.96 Firms today routinely exceed 
the $1 million nonperformance-based compensation threshold.97 
                                                                                                                        
89 See id. The “material terms” that must be approved by shareholders in-
clude the executives eligible to receive compensation, a description of the criteria 
on which the performance goals are based, and either the maximal compensation 
or the formula used to calculate the compensation to be paid if the performance 
goals are met. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(4)(i). 
90 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A). 
91 See id. 
92 See Walker, supra note 4, at 361. 
93 See id. at 361–62. 
94 See id. 
95 See David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as 
an Implicit Contracting Cost Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive 
Compensation, 77 ACCT. REV. 997, 998 (2002). 
96 See Steven N. Kaplan, CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: 
Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 10 (2013). 
97 See Walker, supra note 4, at 383. According to Michael Doran, Uncapping 
Executive Pay, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 116–17 (2017), 58 percent of the S&P 
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These firms state in their proxy statements that the tax conse-
quence is only one of the considerations the board considers when 
deciding on the executive compensation.98 
In addition, many firms adopt performance-based compen-
sation plans that are deductible under section 162(m).99 First, as 
noted above, stock options are usually deductible if the exercise 
price of the option is not less than the fair market value of a share 
on the date the option is granted.100 Second, firms can adopt per-
formance targets that are easily attainable.101 Per Bebchuk and 
Fried, performance-based payments are often conditioned on eas-
ily achieved performance targets that do not reflect good perfor-
mance relative to peer firms.102 Performance-based plans often 
grant executives a higher compensation for events that are not 
necessarily connected to good managerial performance, such as 
positive developments in the market or making acquisitions.103 
Thus, to circumvent this rule, firms might adopt risky pay strat-
egies that are still not performance-based.104 Third, section 162(m) 
does not apply after the executive retires, so this rule can be cir-
cumvented if nonperformance-based compensation is granted as 
retirement benefits.105 
 Although section 162(m) requires the shareholders’ ap-
proval for the “material terms” of the performance-based compen-
sation plan,106 shareholders have little influence on the actual 
compensation schemes. The material terms on which sharehold-
ers vote do not usually specify the design of any pay package.107 
Instead, the material terms usually include only general param-
eters and vague targets.108 In addition, as argued by Bebchuk and 
                                                                                                                        
500 companies paid their CEO nonperformance salaries exceeding $1 million 
in 2014. Doran also finds that companies have become more willing to exceed 
the $1 million cap over time. See id. at 109–12.  
98 See Walker, supra note 4, at 383.  
99 See id. at 361. 
100 See supra note 90.  
101 See Doran, supra note 97, at 121; Walker, supra note 4, at 384.  
102 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 78, at 135. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. at 138. 
105 See id. at 110–11. 
106 § 162(m)(4)(c)(ii). 
107 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 78, at 196. 
108 See id. 
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Fried, shareholders can fail to approve a compensation plan, but 
such a veto might not make them better off.109 Bebchuk and Fried 
also argue that the enthusiasm in the last two decades in favor of 
performance-based compensation, supported by Congress in en-
acting section 162(m), was used by managers by adding more such 
compensation without a corresponding downward adjustment in 
cash compensation.110 
3. Using Taxation to Encourage Performance-Based  
Compensation 
 Taxation can be used to incentivize the adoption of certain 
compensation schemes. If a tax is imposed on nonperformance-
based compensation, it increases the cost of such compensation 
scheme.111 If this tax burden is borne by managers, even partially, 
they would have a greater incentive to prefer performance-based 
compensation.112 If shareholders benefit from performance-based 
executive compensation, they should support it even without a tax 
penalty on nonperformance-based compensation.113 However, as 
noted by Bebchuk and Fried, the shareholders’ ability to success-
fully object and negotiate efficient compensation packages might 
be limited.114 
 The experience with section 162(m) indicates that managers 
in some firms have a lot of power over the compensation-setting 
process, and this can be used to approve pay plans that result in 
triggering a tax penalty to the corporation.115 If firms with worse 
corporate governance are more likely to adopt payment schemes 
that trigger a tax penalty, this tax rule might aggravate the harm 
to the shareholders investing in these firms and also to the overall 
social deadweight loss.116 
                                                                                                                        
109 See id. at 49. 
110 See id. at 73. 
111 See id. at 122. 
112 See id. 
113 See id.  
114 See id. at 49. 
115 See Doran, supra note 97, at 116–17, for a review of S&P 500 companies 
that grant compensation that triggers this tax penalty.  
116 As discussed above, these costs might be borne by immobile factors such 
as labor. See also id. at 120. 
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 Moreover, a tax rule that disallows the deduction of a cer-
tain expense would affect different firms differently, depending 
on their relevant tax rates.117 If a firm is subject to a marginal 
corporate income tax rate of 35 percent, the cost of disallowing 
deduction would be 35 percent times the expense. However, if the 
marginal tax rate is only about 3 percent, the cost of disallowing 
the deduction of an expense would be much lower. Although the 
statutory corporate income tax rate in the United States is 35 per-
cent, most large firms use tax planning to lower that tax rate sig-
nificantly, and it is possible that a non-deduction rule would be 
less costly to some firms.118 Companies that can carry forward 
losses (which may be a result of poor managerial decisions) can 
avoid paying corporate income tax,119 thus resulting in low effec-
tiveness of disallowing a deduction. Generally, firms that incur a 
lower tax penalty would have a weaker incentive to adopt perfor-
mance-based compensation plans. As a lower tax rate might not 
be associated with better or worse managerial performance, it is 
unclear if there should be a different treatment of firms based on 
the tax rates they are subject to.120 One solution for this would be 
                                                                                                                        
117 See Schizer, supra note 9, at 5. This is a general problem where corrective 
taxes are imposed on income, and the applicable tax rates vary across taxpayers.  
118 See, e.g., Philip Van Doorn, Here are the actual tax rates the biggest com-
panies in America pay, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 14, 2017), http://www.marketwatch 
.com/story/these-companies-may-enjoy-a-windfall-under-trumps-tax-plan-2017 
-09-29 [https://perma.cc/7ZGK-FKYM] (showing that the effective tax rates that 
Dow Jones companies pay vary greatly); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-16-363, CORPORATE INCOME TAX: MOST LARGE PROFITABLE U.S. CORPO-
RATIONS PAID TAX BUT EFFECTIVE TAX RATES DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM 
THE STATUTORY RATE i, 13, (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675844.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D2U5-2NWA] (showing that large firms paid an average of 
16.1 percent of reported income in 2012, which is well below the statutory rate 
of 35 percent).  
119 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 118, at 5. 
120 Schizer, supra note 9, at 5, notes that “a firm with substantial net oper-
ating losses, which would not pay taxes anyway, could be immune from the penalty. 
If anything, this seems backwards. Firms may be unprofitable because of agency 
costs, and these firms should not be left out.” However, as discussed in Section 
IV.A below, there is evidence suggesting that firms with entrenched managers 
engage in less tax-avoidance. See infra Section IV.A. A profitable, well-governed 
firm can report a loss for tax purposes in the United States while shifting profits 
offshore. Therefore, it is uncertain whether lower applicable tax rates are generally 
associated with better or worse governance and managerial performance.  
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to set a corrective tax irrespective of the corporate income tax li-
ability.121 For example, the corrective tax imposed on the firm or 
on the executive can be a fixed percentage of the nonperformance-
based compensation. 
 The experience with section 162(m) also shows that a broad 
and vague definition of performance-based compensation can sig-
nificantly undermine the effectiveness of that rule in promoting a 
real performance-based compensation. As discussed above, many 
forms of performance-based compensation, deductible under this 
section, could be based on easily attainable targets, activities that 
do not increase shareholder value, or windfalls.122 A more sophis-
ticated tax rule could, in theory, allow the deduction of performance-
based compensation only if it filters out all nonperformance factors. 
The tax rule can also impose other limitations suggested by Bebchuk 
and Fried, such as limitations on executives’ ability to unload eq-
uity incentives.123 However, enforcing a sophisticated tax rule that 
requires filtering out all the nonperformance factors and wind-
falls might be very complicated and costly, and the tax authority 
might not have the expertise to administer such rule.124 Moreover, 
a narrow approach to a deductible performance-based compensation 
might result in more firms, especially those with worse corporate 
governance, choosing to pay high nonperformance-based compen-
sation while incurring higher tax.125 Therefore, it is possible that 
even though a more targeted tax rule could allow favorable treat-
ment only of real performance-based compensation, this rule might 
not solve the problem of managers having an excessive power over 
the compensation-setting process and rewarding themselves in 
compensation that is not linked to performance. 
In summary, section 162(m) fails to achieve its goal to en-
courage real performance-based compensation, while it increases 
                                                                                                                        
121 It is possible to determine that the additional taxable income, resulting 
from a non-deduction rule, will be taxed at the highest corporate income tax 
rate, similar to § 7874. I.R.C. § 7874(e)(2)(C). 
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124 See Schizer, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing the mismatch in institutional 
focus and expertise where government tax experts administer rules that address 
corporate governance problems).  
125 See infra Section II.G.  
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the costs for companies and the overall deadweight loss, espe-
cially for companies with worse corporate governance as they are 
more likely to trigger the tax penalty. Thus, repealing this tax rule is 
socially desirable.126 As the tax system cannot effectively assess 
what a real performance-based compensation is, encouraging pay-
for-performance should be done through corporate governance mech-
anisms and not through the tax system. 
B. Preventing Harmful Changes in Control 
1. Golden Parachutes 
 Golden parachutes are any form of compensation granted 
to executives in connection with a change in control.127 There are 
several reasons why firms like granting golden parachutes. Even 
excellent managers might oppose a value-increasing change in 
control if the new controller might replace them.128 Granting 
managers golden parachutes would encourage them to support a 
beneficial sale of the firm, a sale that they might otherwise oppose. 
Where the management is entrenched, giving underperforming 
executives a golden parachute if they are to cede control would 
compensate them for forgoing the private benefits of control.129 
This may increase the value of the firm if a better management 
replaces the entrenched one. Empirical evidence shows that firms 
that offer golden parachute packages have a higher likelihood of 
receiving an acquisition offer and being acquired.130 Golden para-
chutes are associated with a higher acquisition premium and this 
association is explained at least partly by the effect of golden para-
chutes on executive incentives.131 
 However, golden parachutes might have negative conse-
quences.132 One rationale for limiting golden parachutes may be 
connected to a general motivation to reduce excessive executive 
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compensation. This topic is further discussed below.133 It is un-
clear if there should be a special treatment of golden parachutes 
on that basis because golden parachutes are only one form of com-
pensation. Another reason to reduce the use of golden parachutes 
is to prevent inefficient and value-decreasing changes in control 
that are backed by the management because it receives large pri-
vate benefits in the form of golden parachutes.134 Where the man-
agers’ employment is terminated after the control has been changed, 
they might be less sensitive to reputational costs and may not be 
held accountable for future poor performance.135 Even if share-
holders can veto some events of change in control, managers still 
have a strong influence on the approval processes and the informa-
tion provided to the shareholders. If they have a strong personal 
benefit from approving such changes, they might try to reduce the 
shareholders’ ability to effectively monitor and prevent harmful 
changes in control. 
 Golden parachutes affect executive incentives in general, 
not only with respect to a sale of the firm.136 Firms that adopted 
golden parachutes have lower risk-adjusted stock returns relative 
to their industry peers that did not adopt golden parachutes, both 
during the two-year period surrounding the adoption and in the 
subsequent several years.137 It is not clear what causes these low 
returns.138 Bebchuk et al. suggest that it can be explained, at least 
partially, by the effect of golden parachutes on executive incen-
tives and performance not facing an acquisition offer.139 They ar-
gue that the market for corporate control disciplines managers 
because they know that they might lose their job if they under-
perform, and that this disciplinary force is weakened where the 
managers are guaranteed a large benefit in the event of a change 
in control.140 This explanation might not be relevant to firms with 
                                                                                                                        
133 See infra Section II.D. 
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244 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:221 
entrenched management, as the executives in these firms are al-
ready insulated from the market for corporate control. Alternatively, 
it is possible that golden parachutes are associated with worse per-
formance, but do not cause it.141 More research analyzing these 
effects is needed. 
 In summary, rules that discourage the use of golden para-
chutes may improve managers’ incentives with respect to unde-
sirable sales and increase the disciplinary force of the market for 
corporate control on executive incentives.142 However, the use of 
golden parachutes can increase the value for shareholders by provid-
ing executive incentives to pursue beneficial sales,143 especially 
where the management is entrenched. 
2. The Golden Parachute Tax Rule 
 In general, a large “golden parachute” payment is not de-
ductible to the corporation,144 and the receiving executive is sub-
ject to a 20 percent excise tax on such payment.145 The following par-
agraphs review this tax treatment. 
 Section 280G disallows the deduction of excessive parachute 
payments, triggered by change in control to disqualified individ-
uals.146 The term “parachute payment” includes all compensation 
forms granted to a disqualified individual in connection with a 
change in control.147 A change in control includes any of the fol-
lowing three events: a change in ownership of the corporation’s stock; 
a change in ownership of a substantial portion of the corporation’s 
assets; or a change in effective control of the corporation.148 Disqual-
ified individuals include officers of the corporation, shareholders 
who own more than 1 percent of the fair market value of the cor-
poration’s stock, and highly compensated individuals.149 
Parachute payments are excessive if the amount of the para-
chute payments exceeds a threshold amount, which is calculated 
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as three times the disqualified individual’s “base amount” (the av-
erage annual compensation of the individual over the past five 
years).150 The “three times base amount” is a threshold test, so if the 
parachute payments exceed three times the base amount, the total 
excessive parachute payments equal the total parachute payments 
less one times the base amount.151 An amount of up to three times 
the base amount will not trigger this unfavorable tax treatment.152 
 Under section 4999, the disqualified individual should pay 
a 20 percent tax on all excessive parachute payments which he or 
she receives, in addition to the ordinary income tax on such in-
come.153 The firm may gross up the payment to the disqualified 
individual for the excise tax, but the gross-up payments will be 
considered as excessive parachute payments, subject to the 20 per-
cent excise tax, and will not be deductible to the corporation.154 Many 
firms provide their executives with golden parachute tax gross-
ups, even though these are very costly.155 However, these gross-ups 
have become a target for criticism because of their high cost, and pub-
lic firms are under pressure to eliminate these arrangements.156 
3. Using Taxation to Prevent Harmful Sales 
 Taxing golden parachutes should reduce the use of compen-
sation granted based on a change in control. The benefits from 
reducing the use of golden parachutes are lower incentives to ap-
prove value-decreasing sales, and possibly better exposure to the 
disciplinary force of the market for corporate control.157 The costs 
from reducing the use of golden parachutes derive from lower in-
centives for executives to facilitate a beneficial sale that might 
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result in their replacement.158 Shareholders in firms that reduce 
their golden parachutes benefit from a lower cost of compensation 
for the managers, whereas shareholders in firms that grant high 
golden parachutes incur the additional cost of the tax. 
 It is possible that firms with worse corporate governance 
are more likely to grant large golden parachute packages despite 
their high cost.159 This may mitigate the problem of entrench-
ment, as managers would have higher incentives to sell, but 
would not mitigate the threat of a value-decreasing change in con-
trol, which might be greater in firms with poor corporate gover-
nance and ineffective monitoring.160 Poorly governed firms that 
do not grant their entrenched managers golden parachutes are 
less likely to be sold, and underperforming managers are less 
likely to be replaced.161  
 Executives in well-governed firms are more likely to reduce 
to size of golden parachute packages in response to a high tax 
penalty.162 However, executives in well-governed firms are already 
less likely to agree to a value-decreasing change in control, so the 
benefit from preventing harmful changes in control might be lim-
ited in respect of these firms.163 As discussed above, executives in 
all firms may oppose a beneficial sale that might risk their future 
employment if they are not provided with an incentive to agree to 
such sale.164 Thus, the tax penalty would likely result in less 
value-increasing sales.  
 It is unclear whether the overall benefits from imposing a 
corrective tax on golden parachutes exceed the costs. The mixed 
benefits and costs make the assessment of whether golden para-
chutes are good or bad a context-specific question, and the general 
net long-term effect is ambiguous.165 Imposing a tax on golden 
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parachutes would reduce some of the inefficiencies created by 
them, but also some of the beneficial incentives they create. In 
addition, executives of some firms shift the tax burden onto their 
firms,166 and this additional cost increases the overall social costs. 
 Is a tax on golden parachutes superior to other forms of 
regulation? One form of regulation is to impose a ban on granting 
any compensation above a certain threshold in connection with a 
change in control.167 The difference between a ban and a corrective 
tax is that under a tax, the firms can choose whether they prefer to 
pay the additional tax and grant the golden parachute.168 A gen-
eral ban on golden parachutes might be problematic because it 
prevents beneficial uses of golden parachutes. As mentioned above, 
it is unclear whether granting golden parachutes despite the tax 
penalty reduces the agency costs or aggravates them, thereby fur-
ther decreasing the shareholder value. 
 Another possible regulation is to empower shareholders 
and increase their monitoring on golden parachute contracts. The 
2010 Dodd-Frank Act mandated advisory shareholder votes on all 
future adoptions of golden parachutes by public firms.169 Corpo-
rate laws can adopt a stricter policy, such as requiring share-
holder approval for golden parachutes, and not only an advisory 
vote. It is possible that empowered shareholders would be able to 
limit the use of a golden parachute when it is against their interest, 
and allow it when it is beneficial for them. However, the share-
holders might face similar ambiguities when deciding whether 
golden parachutes serve their interest or not; this is because their 
overall effect on executive incentives is uncertain.170 
 Another policy alternative is to impose a performance-based 
corrective taxation on the golden parachute payments. The tax 
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will be imposed after a certain period has passed since the change 
in control, when it is possible to assess whether the sale has in-
creased value to shareholders, filtering out negative and positive 
effects caused by market trends and other windfalls. The assess-
ment of the excess return, the benefit resulting from the change 
in control, can be done by economists in an independent agency 
separated from the IRS to isolate it from pressures to raise more 
revenues. A more sophisticated form of a performance-based cor-
rective tax would tie the size of the golden parachute, the benefit 
or cost to the corporation from the change in control, and the tax 
rate.171 As suggested by Walker in his proposal mentioned below, 
it is possible to grant the investors a tax relief equal to the tax 
paid by the executives.172 Alternatively, the golden parachute it-
self could be designed this way, in an agreement that resembles 
a clawback provision.173 
 To conclude, it is questionable whether taxing golden para-
chutes results in better incentives for managers and in a higher 
firm value, especially in poorly governed firms. Other forms of 
regulation, such as strengthening external and internal monitor-
ing on changes in control, might be superior to corrective taxation. 
C. Breaking Pyramidal Business Structures 
1. The Rationales for Breaking Pyramidal Business  
Structures 
 The main corporate governance concern regarding pyram-
idal business structures is the separation between ownership and 
control, which is also described in the literature as a separation 
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between cash flow rights and voting rights.174 Control achieved 
through a pyramidal structure could be beneficial for the control-
ler where the private benefits of control are large.175 
 Separation of ownership and control might have serious 
corporate governance ramifications. One major threat is manage-
rial entrenchment: managers that do not maximize the value of 
the corporation and cannot be voted out by shareholders because 
they control the top of the pyramid of the business group.176 An 
entrenched controller with most of the cash flow rights would not 
be disciplined by the market for corporate control, but would still be 
incentivized to increase the firm’s value because he or she holds 
a large stake of the cash flow rights.177 However, where both mar-
ket discipline and financial incentives are absent, like in business 
pyramids with multiple layers and a large gap between voting 
rights and cash flow rights, entrenchment might result in having 
managers not promoting the interest of the other stakeholders.178 
 Another major concern is that pyramidal structures pro-
vide the controller with greater tunneling opportunities. Tunneling 
can take place where assets are transferred for less than their 
actual value from a firm in which the controller’s share of owner-
ship is low to a firm in which the controller’s share of ownership 
is high.179 The controller may be able to take opportunities of the 
business group and exploit them in a manner that benefits him or 
her at the expense of other shareholders.180 In addition, complexity 
in pyramidal business structures can be used to disguise diversion 
and accounting manipulations that would be more transparent in a 
flatter and less complex structure.181 Tunneling can also take 
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place through the employment of family members and friends as 
executives and directors in the various firms in the pyramid.182 
 A pyramidal structure might also create suboptimal incen-
tives for business decisions regarding expanding and contracting. 
Controllers of pyramidal business groups might have incentives 
to expand more than is desirable, as well as stronger incentives 
to avoid contracting.183 These incentives arise because the con-
troller can extract private benefits from capital that is inside the 
business group, while bearing only a fraction of the costs associ-
ated with raising this capital.184 
 The greater the gap between the cash flow rights and the 
voting rights held by the controller, the more serious the distor-
tions are, as incentives for tunneling and underperformance due 
to entrenchment increase.185 Several studies have documented 
these phenomena in various countries, including India,186 South 
Korea,187 China,188 Hong Kong,189 Taiwan,190 and Italy.191 There is 
a significant body of empirical literature which shows that pyram-
idal business structures are associated with a lower value for out-
side shareholders, and that this reduction in value is higher when 
the gap between cash flow rights and voting rights increases.192 
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 Some arguments in support of pyramidal structures are 
relevant mostly to developing countries. In a developing country, 
large business groups can substitute for weak external institu-
tions by raising capital, contracting, and developing human capital 
within the pyramidal business group.193 These advantages are 
likely very small in developed countries.194 Other considerations 
supporting eliminating pyramidal business structures include 
concerns regarding competition and political power of these groups, 
as well as the tax-avoidance opportunities that these structures 
might enable.195 Private ordering without regulatory intervention 
might not mitigate some of the negative effects of pyramidal busi-
ness groups, as shown in evidence documenting this phenomenon 
in various countries.196 This could be explained by the business 
groups’ concentrated market power, strong political power, and 
access to funding from financial institutions.197 
                                                                                                                        
193 See id. at 16?17. 
194 See id. 
195 Large business groups might gain market power that could endanger 
competition. See Morck, supra note 1, at 163–64. Some countries are concerned 
with the increased market power of large business groups. For example, a few 
years ago Israel adopted a law which limits business groups’ pyramidal struc-
tures because of concerns regarding concentrated market power and limited 
competition. See The Law for Promotion of Competition and Reduction of Con-
centration, 5774-2013 (2013) (Isr.), http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law 
/2420/2420.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGT3-WWU5], translated in http://www.anti 
trust.gov.il/eng/subject/215.aspx [https://perma.cc/7JDW-MUJG]. The Roose-
velt administration was concerned about the strong political power of a wealthy 
business elite that controlled the business groups. Pyramidal corporate groups 
allow wealthy individuals and families to control assets worth much more than 
their actual wealth. In addition, once business groups are established, they are 
hard to dismantle because of the political power their controllers exert. Other 
political economy considerations, such as increased incentives for business 
groups to intervene in politics through lobbying instead of investing in enhanc-
ing productivity, may also support the dismantling of pyramidal business 
groups. See Morck, supra note 1, at 164–66. In addition, it is possible that a 
complex domestic structure provides a greater ability to shift income between 
affiliated entities and to avoid taxation. Tax planning opportunities may exist 
where different affiliates have different profits and are subject to different tax 
regimes. See id. at 162–63. 
196 See Bebchuk, supra note 174, at 11?12. 
197 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
252 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:221 
2. Intercorporate Dividend Taxation  
 One unique tax rule in the United States is the taxation of 
intercorporate dividends.198 In general, if a corporation receives a 
dividend from another corporation, the dividend is taxed at the 
rate of 10.5 percent.199 If the corporation receiving the dividend 
owns between 20 percent and 80 percent of the distributing cor-
poration’s stock, the dividend is taxed at the rate of 7 percent.200 
If the corporation receiving the dividend owns more than 80 per-
cent of the distributing corporation, the dividend is not taxed.201 
This non-taxation applies only if the corporation paying the divi-
dend is liable for tax in the United States.202 No other major econ-
omy in the world imposes comparable taxation on dividends paid by 
subsidiaries to parent companies.203 In fact, the European Union 
forbids its members from imposing such taxes.204 For most coun-
tries in the world, pyramidal business groups dominate large cor-
porate sectors.205 
 According to Morck, the intercorporate dividend tax in the 
United States was adopted as a part of a deliberate and successful 
strategy in the 1930s, which aimed to break pyramidal business 
groups; these were believed to cause corporate governance problems, 
tax avoidance, antitrust issues, and highly concentrated political 
influence.206 The Roosevelt administration convinced Congress to 
take major steps against business groups, including enacting in-
tercorporate dividend taxes, abolishing consolidated tax filing for 
business groups, eliminating capital gains taxes on liquidated 
controlled subsidiaries, and banning pyramidal business groups 
from controlling public utility companies.207 It is worth noting the 
future of the intercorporate dividend tax is uncertain, and it might 
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be eliminated in the future.208 The Bush administration tried elim-
inating the tax without success in early drafts of the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, enacted in 2003.209 
3. Using Taxation to Break Pyramidal Business Structures 
 As discussed above, many empirical studies show the neg-
ative implications of pyramidal business structures in developed 
economies, while the positive benefits are very limited. Although 
the negative effects are well documented, it is hard to gauge the 
average cost caused by using pyramidal levels.210 Therefore, the 
case for banning or limiting pyramidal structures by using a ban 
appears more compelling than the use of corrective taxation. 
 It is important to distinguish between corrective taxation that 
aims to internalize negative externalities, and tax penalties that 
are used to ensure compliance with a particular rule regardless of 
the externalities involved.211 A sufficiently high tax penalty can be 
used to enforce a de facto ban or obligation. For example, the 30 per-
cent withholding tax imposed on certain payments to non-partici-
pating foreign financial institutions under the Foreign Accounting 
Tax Compliance Act was adopted as a tax penalty to achieve the 
full cooperation of foreign financial institutions.212 One considera-
tion that might support using tax penalties rather than a ban is 
the political ability to legislate these penalties. Another consider-
ation is institutional: which agency should enforce this rule? The 
IRS is likely to enforce the tax penalty, whereas the SEC is more 
likely to enforce a ban imposed on publicly traded firms.213  
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 It is possible that the intercorporate taxation in the United 
States is a tax penalty that operates as a de facto ban, although 
it still allows pyramidal structures where the benefits are large 
enough. A few years ago, Israel adopted a ban on a pyramidal struc-
ture with more than two levels.214 A controlled firm can control no 
more than one other firm.215 If the lower firm controls another firm, 
a court will appoint a trustee to sell the remaining firm.216 The 
Israeli legislature considered and rejected following the American 
model of taxing the intercorporate dividends.217 It is unclear 
which model is superior, though it seems that either a ban or a 
tax penalty that is high enough can achieve similar results. 
 A corrective tax on pyramidal structures should be set on 
the negative externality resulting from that structure.218 The in-
efficiencies associated with pyramids increase where the gap be-
tween voting rights and cash flow rights are larger.219 Therefore, 
corrective tax should increase in a similar manner. The current 
tax rules in the United States impose a higher tax on holdings 
lower than 20 percent, a lower tax on holdings between 20 and 80 
percent, and no tax where the holdings exceed 80 percent.220 This 
may serve as a very rough approximation of the negative exter-
nalities that increase where the controller’s share is lower. One 
advantage of having these three categories is the simplicity of this 
rule. However, imposing a similar tax where the holding is 21 per-
cent and where it is 79 percent cannot be justified on corrective 
grounds, as the externalities should be very different. In addition, 
imposing a higher tax on intercorporate dividends where there is no 
effective control—where the holding is lower than 20  percent—
would be hard to explain as a corrective measure. 
 If the negative externality decreases with ownership, the tax 
on intercorporate dividends can track this relationship by adjusting 
the tax to the ownership rights. We should find the level of ownership 
which enables an effective control—for example, 30 percent—and 
the level of ownership which is high enough to provide sufficient 
incentives to the owner—for example, 80 percent. If the negative 
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effects decrease linearly, the tax should follow this by decreasing 
from a high tax rate, where the ownership is 30 percent, to a zero 
tax rate, where the ownership is 80 percent. 
 One advantage of optimal corrective taxation over a ban or 
a tax penalty—that serves as a de facto ban—is that the former 
does not prevent efficient pyramids, where there is a value-max-
imizing reason to have a pyramidal structure.221 However, assess-
ing the accurate negative externalities associated with different 
pyramidal structures would be very hard.222 A corrective tax 
which is too low would result in a social cost from having many 
inefficient pyramids, whereas a corrective tax which is too high 
would be a de facto ban. In addition, it may be more politically 
feasible to adopt a tax, including a tax penalty that is a de facto 
ban, rather than an outright ban.223 
 An alternative to a tax or a ban is regulation that imposes 
stricter standards on pyramidal business groups, or empowers the 
noncontrolling shareholders. In theory, these regulations could re-
duce the private benefits of control and other inefficiencies. However, 
the effectiveness of these measures might be limited due to infor-
mation and collective action problems.224 
 To conclude, the abundance of evidence on the inefficien-
cies caused by pyramidal structures, and the dearth of evidence 
supporting positive benefits from pyramids, support adopting a 
ban or a tax penalty that operates as a de facto ban rather than a 
corrective tax. 
D. Reducing Excessive Executive Compensation 
1. Executive Compensation 
 According to Jensen and Meckling, a board of directors that 
cannot fully observe the effort and effectiveness of the firm’s ex-
ecutives would negotiate a contract in order to minimize agency 
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costs and maximize shareholder value.225 An alternative theory 
contends that the outside directors who decide on executive com-
pensation lack proper incentives to set executive compensation 
that maximizes shareholder value, and that the executives’ influ-
ence over the board undermines the directors’ independence and 
ability to serve the firm’s best interest.226 In addition, if a sub-
stantial number of firms pay excessive executive compensation, 
other firms will also increase their compensation level through 
benchmarking, and the overall level of compensation will go up.227 
 While the average executive pay of large listed companies 
increased substantially since the 1980s,228 some analysts argue 
that this does not necessarily mean current prevalent executive 
compensation levels are excessive. Kaplan found the ratio of large-
company CEO pay compared to firm market value is roughly sim-
ilar to its level in the late 1970s, and lower than its levels before 
the 1960s.229 CEO pay levels relative to other highly paid groups 
today are comparable to their average levels in the early 1990s.230 
These patterns may suggest that similar forces, such as technol-
ogy and scale, have played a meaningful role in driving executive 
compensation, as well as the pay of others with top incomes.231 
Kaplan contends that although pay levels are very high relative 
to the typical household, a meaningful part of CEO pay appears 
to be driven by the market for talent.232 
 Excessive executive compensation might still exist where 
there are corporate governance failures and pay outliers. Exces-
sive compensation, which is a form of tunneling, is inefficient be-
cause it imposes an additional cost on investment in the corporate 
sector, resulting in the distortion of capital allocation.233 Walker 
contends that economic cost created by excessive compensation 
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reduces the investors’ return from investment in the corporate 
sector, in a manner that is analogous to corporate income tax.234 
If the incidence of corporate taxation is at least partially similar 
to the incidence of excessive executive compensation, it is likely 
that a significant portion of this cost is shifted in the long run 
from shareholders to immobile production factors, such as labor.235 
In the short run, unexpected increases in executive compensation 
might be borne by existing shareholders.236 However, predicted lev-
els of excessive pay would reduce the return on domestic stocks, 
and some capital that would have been invested in stocks would 
flow to other investment opportunities.237 Excessive executive com-
pensation may also be objectionable because of its distributive con-
sequences.238 Excessive compensation may have been a contributing 
factor to the increase in the inequality of wealth distribution in the 
United States in the last recent decades.239  
2. Using Taxation to Reduce Excessive Executive  
Compensation 
 Taxation can be used to mitigate a market failure with re-
spect to excessive executive compensation in publicly traded firms. 
Walker suggests imposing a surtax on executive compensation in 
excess of a certain threshold, combined with granting sharehold-
ers a tax relief equal to the tax paid by their executives.240 Walker 
predicts that this surtax would create only minor distortions, as 
the evidence on the elasticity of executive labor supply and taxa-
ble income indicates that a modest increase of the tax on execu-
tive compensation would have little influence on hours worked.241 
If, however, managers were able to shift this tax onto the firm by 
increasing the pre-tax compensation level, it could undermine the 
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purpose of this proposal.242 Although the experience with the 
“golden parachute” tax suggests a portion of the surtax might be 
shifted from managers to investors, Walker believes the ability to 
shift this tax would be limited, and the surtax could be increased 
as a response to an increase in the pre-tax compensation level.243 
He also contends that there is no high likelihood this surtax would 
cause a significant number of private firms to avoid becoming 
public, or that public firms would go private.244 
Walker suggests adopting a combined approach of impos-
ing a surtax combined with providing a tax relief, mainly because 
of the risk that some of the surtax would be shifted to investors.245 
If excessive executive compensation is inefficient because it imposes 
an additional cost on investment in the corporate sector, and if 
the surtax could be partially shifted onto investors, then this sur-
tax might exacerbate the distortion and further suppress invest-
ment in the corporate sector.246 Providing tax relief equal to the 
surtax would mitigate this distortion.247 The tax relief could be 
firm-specific or general, and can be structured in a few ways.248 
Although firm-specific tax relief would mitigate the distortion cre-
ated by the tax, firms might be more willing to increase the com-
pensation if they receive a firm-specific tax relief equal to the tax.249   
This proposal has the potential to reduce executive compen-
sation. However, similar to the discussion above regarding sec-
tion 162(m) and golden parachutes, executives in poorly governed 
firms are more likely to shift the tax burden onto their firms, in 
whole or in part.250 Consequently, the effectiveness of this tool might 
be limited, especially with respect to poorly governed firms. It is 
unclear whether reducing compensation levels of executives in 
well-governed firms is desirable. As noted by Walker, it is possible 
that the compensation packages of executives in such firms are 
excessive as a result of benchmarking and upward ratcheting.251 
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However, if the prevalent current pay levels are not excessive in 
these firms, as suggested by Kaplan, corrective taxation might 
distort the market for corporate managers.252 Therefore, there is 
a risk that using corrective taxation to reduce the level of execu-
tive compensation might be ineffective for poorly governed firms, 
and distortive for well-governed firms.  
If the optimal levels of compensation vary across firms and 
industries, the use of corrective taxation which is calculated based 
on the average negative externality would likely be suboptimal.253 
As noted by Walker, it is possible to customize the corrective tax 
based on factors such as firm size and risk.254 However, it is un-
clear whether the government has enough information to be able 
to define groups of companies that should have similar levels of com-
pensation, define the optimal level of compensation, and determine 
what would be the optimal corrective taxation for each group. 
 Defining the thresholds of excessive compensation in legis-
lation might create other distortions, such as the ratcheting-up 
effect caused by the $1 million amount in section 162(m).255 This 
is the reason why Walker suggests adopting relatively low thresh-
olds.256 However, if the prevalent current pay levels are not ex-
cessive, as suggested by Kaplan, low thresholds might distort the 
market for corporate managers.257  
 Similar to the discussion above regarding performance-
based compensation, it is possible that other forms of regulation, 
such as empowering shareholders and strengthening board’s in-
dependence, would be more effective than taxation in addressing 
the problem of executive compensation.258 
E. Reducing Tunneling Through Related-Party Transactions 
1. Related-Party Transactions 
 Related-party transactions typically involve a deal between a 
firm and its controller, or one of its executives, or a transaction 
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between affiliated entities.259 The main concern in related-party 
transactions is that the deal might be used for tunneling, serving 
the interest of an insider, usually the executive or the controller, at 
the expense of the corporation and the outside shareholders.260 This 
is usually done through pricing that does not follow the arm’s length 
principle, where insiders sell overpriced assets or services to the 
firm, or buy assets or services from the firm for a price below their 
fair value.261 The concern is greater where the party who benefits 
from the transaction has fewer cash flow rights in the firm.262 
 Related-party transactions could be beneficial to the corpo-
ration in some cases, despite the risk that they might enable tunnel-
ing. Their value might be low where a similar transaction can be 
done with an unrelated party. However, there are cases in which 
a related-party transaction could not be easily substituted with a 
transaction with unrelated parties. It might be the case where the 
transaction involves unique assets or if there are asymmetric in-
formation problems that reduce the attractiveness of offers from 
external parties. It is also possible that some related-party trans-
actions would produce rents from synergy where related parties 
collaborate. Nonetheless, in these cases where there are no market 
benchmarks for similar arm’s length transactions, it is harder to 
determine whether the transaction is beneficial to the corporation.  
 Related-party transactions are usually regulated but not 
banned.263 They are subject to disclosure requirements and spe-
cial audit standards.264 For example, Delaware Corporate Law sets 
requirements for an approval of a transaction between a corpora-
tion and its directors, officers, or parties related to them.265 It re-
quires that the transaction should be fair to the corporation, that 
there be a full disclosure of the interest to the board and share-
holders, and also an approval by the shareholders and the disin-
terested directors.266 
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2. Using Taxation to Reduce Tunneling Through Related-
Party Transactions 
 What would be the effect of imposing a surtax on related-
party transactions? Assume that a surtax is imposed on the insider 
dealing with the firm or on the firm itself. The surtax could be 
calculated as a percentage of the value transferred or as a per-
centage of the profit from the transaction. Where tunneling is 
done through an overpriced sale of an asset from the insider to the 
firm, a surtax on the sale profit or the gross receipt may eliminate 
the insider’s benefit, unless he or she can shift the tax burden onto 
the firm. Where tunneling takes place through an underpriced 
sale of an asset from the firm to an insider, a tax calculated as a 
percentage of the purchase could be used to eliminate the benefit. 
 Where there is no comparable arm’s length transaction, it 
is hard to determine which party is gaining or losing. Such a sur-
tax would likely reduce some bad transactions that are used for 
tunneling and some good transactions that are beneficial to the 
firm. A surtax that is not too high would allow the very beneficial 
related-party transactions to take place, while preventing the 
moderately beneficial ones. Likewise, it would prevent the moder-
ately bad transactions, while maintaining managerial incentives to 
conduct transactions in which the tunneled value is very high. It 
is possible that the very bad transactions would be prevented by 
other corporate governance mechanisms, such as the fiduciary du-
ties of care and loyalty. Remaining transactions that get through in 
spite of the tax would be subject to more attention, and require a 
strong justification, and therefore monitoring might be easier.  
It is unclear if the benefit from preventing bad related-party 
transactions exceeds the cost from preventing beneficial related-
party transactions. A tax might be superior to a complete ban on 
related-party transactions, as the very good transactions would 
take place under a tax, whereas they would be prevented under a 
ban.267 However, as the costs and benefits from related-party 
transactions vary significantly, depending on the specific trans-
action, a corrective tax is unlikely to be the optimal regulatory in-
strument.268 In addition, poorly governed firms might still approve 
transactions that trigger the tax, although they do not benefit the 
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firm, thereby exacerbating the harm to shareholders and the so-
cial deadweight loss. Therefore, the case for imposing a surtax on 
related-party transactions to reduce tunneling through such trans-
actions appears unconvincing.  
 Other forms of regulation could possibly lead to approving 
good transactions and rejecting bad ones. Corporate law rules, re-
quiring an approval by a majority of the uninterested directors and 
shareholders, might serve as a more precise mechanism for that 
purpose.269 This mechanism has other limitations that are beyond 
the scope of this Article, and it is possible that even under this 
mechanism harmful transactions would be approved and some 
beneficial transactions would be prevented.270 
 Tax authorities can interfere where the prices used in re-
lated-party transactions do not reflect fair market values under 
the arm’s length principle.271 However, tax authorities only have 
an interest in such transactions if they result in lower tax reve-
nues.272 In many cases, where the assets move from one taxable 
entity to another, tunneling through related-party transactions 
does not result in lower tax revenues.273 Even where taxable in-
come is reduced, tax authorities have limited success in effec-
tively enforcing the arm’s length principle. 
F. Reducing Agency Costs from Entrenchment 
1. Entrenchment 
 As discussed above, managerial entrenchment occurs where 
managers make it impractical or very costly for shareholders to re-
place them.274 One of the main arguments in the corporate gover-
nance literature is that anti-takeover devices are socially inefficient.275 
Anti-takeover devices, such as dual class stocks and poison pills, 
make it harder for shareholders to remove underperforming man-
agers.276 If managers can counter disciplinary forces and entrench 
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themselves, this would cause suboptimal managerial incentives 
because managers are not exposed to the risk of being replaced 
for underperformance.277 In cases where managers hold a large 
stake of the firm’s cash flow rights, they will still have incentives 
to maximize the value of the firm.278 However, the incentive prob-
lem would be greater where managers do not hold equity rights 
high enough to align their interests with shareholders and provide 
them with incentives to maximize the firm’s value.279 
 Supporters of the use of anti-takeover arrangements em-
phasize their importance in preventing harmful takeovers.280 Per 
this view, anti-takeover measures serve an important role in prevent-
ing negative interventions and pressures from short-term-oriented 
activists and harmful hostile takeovers.281 
2. Using Taxation to Reduce Agency Costs from Entrenchment 
 The current tax system does not tax anti-takeover devices.282 
Issuing poison pills and dual class stocks is a non-taxable event.283 
Staggered board structure is a corporate governance practice that 
does not have any tax consequence.284 Nonetheless, as suggested 
by Hynes, it is possible to impose a tax on firms or on their man-
agers if they adopt anti-takeover devices.285 
 This tax would prevent some harmful and some beneficial 
uses of these devices, as discussed above. It would also discourage 
some firms from going public or from issuing a large amount of stocks 
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resulting in increasing the risk of a takeover.286 In addition, it is 
possible that firms with worse corporate governance would be more 
likely to adopt anti-takeover devices despite the tax penalty.287 It 
is unclear what would be the net social gain from this corrective 
taxation. Moreover, it is very hard to assess the economic cost as-
sociated with the use of these devices.288 As a result, it would be 
hard to set a corrective tax equal to the negative externality. A tax 
rate too low or too high would result in the suboptimal use of anti-
takeover devices.289 Therefore, the case for taxing anti-takeover 
devices to reduce agency costs from entrenchment appears uncon-
vincing. It is possible that mechanisms that strengthen the outside 
shareholders’ ability to periodically approve or veto the use of these 
devices would be superior to taxation. 
G. Considerations for Using Corrective Taxation 
 Based on the analysis above, this part identifies the factors 
that limit the effectiveness of taxation in mitigating corporate 
governance inefficiencies. First, because firms with different corpo-
rate governance characteristics vary in their reaction to taxation,290 
imposing the same tax on firms with different characteristics 
might not prompt the desired response. This may be especially 
true for firms with poor corporate governance. The experiences 
with many firms in adopting nonperformance-based compensa-
tion and large golden parachutes indicate that taxation might not 
be an effective means to change practices in poorly governed 
firms. Firms with better corporate governance are more likely to 
alter their practices in response to a corrective tax, whereas firms 
with worse corporate governance might decide to incur the tax 
penalty rather than change their practices. If the tax is formally 
imposed on managers, managers in poorly governed firms are more 
likely to trigger the tax and shift the tax burden onto the firm. 
Therefore, unlike negative externalities that can be internalized 
through corrective taxation, taxation may not effectively counter 
corporate governance agency problems since the same conditions 
that gave rise to the agency problem might undermine the effec-
tiveness of the corrective taxes. 
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 Second, if the tax burden is shifted onto shareholders, in 
whole or in part, it would reduce the taxes’ benefit and the effi-
ciency gain from imposing them. From the shareholders’ standpoint, 
a beneficial tax would be one that reduces the costs from corporate 
governance inefficiencies to such an extent that exceeds the tax 
burden shifted onto the firm. Shareholders might also benefit 
when the increase in tax revenue results in a decrease in other 
taxes.291 From a broader efficiency perspective, corporate agency 
costs reduce investment in the corporate sector and distort the 
allocation of capital.292 If the corrective tax is borne by the firm, 
it would reduce the social benefit from that corrective tax. Walker’s 
proposal, to impose a surtax on excessive executive compensation, 
tries to mitigate this problem by granting the investors a tax re-
lief equal to the surtax paid by the executives.293 However, grant-
ing such a tax relief increases the likelihood that managers would 
shift the tax costs onto firms, especially in poorly governed firms.294 
 Third, the same corporate governance practices that are 
harmful in some situations may be beneficial in others. Imposing 
a tax that discourages the harmful uses of a particular practice 
would discourage the beneficial uses as well.295 Golden parachutes 
encourage managers to find beneficial sales and may overcome 
managerial entrenchment, but they can also lead to harmful 
changes in control.296 Some related-party transactions may be 
used for tunneling, while others can increase firm value.297 Anti-
takeover arrangements might be used by an underperforming 
management to entrench itself, but the same measures could al-
low a firm with excellent management to oppose harmful bids 
that might destroy the firm’s long-term value.298 It would be very 
hard to design a corrective tax that targets only the harmful uses 
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of these practices. Usually in cases where a corrective taxation is 
considered and imposed, there is a clear negative externality as-
sociated with a particular action (e.g., polluting), but that may not 
be the case with corporate governance practices. Since some of the 
corporate governance practices have mixed effects, using a tax 
that would reduce both the harmful and the beneficial uses of 
these practices might not be optimal.299  
A corrective tax should equal the average externality 
where heterogeneity exists. A tax equal to the average external-
ity, calculated by taking into account the offsetting effect of the 
positive externality, could result in not internalizing the negative 
externality of the harmful uses of these practices.300 At the same 
time, it would discourage beneficial uses of these practices. 
Strengthening mechanisms that can distinguish between harm-
ful and beneficial applications, and then allowing only the latter 
ones, could be superior to taxation. 
 Fourth, the tax system is limited in its ability to assess real 
risk and performance goals. As discussed above, the tax penalty 
under section 162(m) could be easily avoided by granting compen-
sation conditioned on easily attainable performance targets.301 
The tax authorities’ limited ability to assess these factors raises 
doubts about the effectiveness of using tax rules to incentivize 
pay-for-performance. 
 Fifth, taxation might not have much advantage over other 
forms of regulation in reducing corporate governance inefficien-
cies. Corrective taxation would be preferable where the government 
does not know what terms are optimal, but can assess the exter-
nalities generated by the relevant behaviors and practices, and 
can impose a tax equal to these externalities.302 If the government 
knows what the best governance terms are, command and control 
regulation would be preferable.303 For example, substantial evi-
dence showing the negative implications of pyramidal business struc-
tures might justify a ban.304 With respect to golden parachutes, 
related-party transactions, and anti-takeover devices, it is unclear 
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what terms are optimal, and it is very hard to assess the exter-
nalities these practices create. ??????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????? ???????? ?????????? ???????????????????? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? the case for using cor-
rective taxes against such corporate governance practices is very 
weak, and different forms of regulation may be preferable. 
 Unlike a ban, taxation results in an action to take place if 
the benefit exceeds the cost of the tax.305 Taxation would be ad-
vantageous where the benefit for the firm from a particular action 
exceeds the tax, whereas a ban would prevent any action regard-
less of the potential benefit.306 However, if insiders, and not the 
firm, receive that benefit while the firm is harmed from the ac-
tion, the shareholders would prefer a ban.307 In addition, a tax 
may be more politically feasible than a ban. Though not within 
the scope of this Article, an alternative to taxation and bans is to 
strengthen the internal and external mechanisms that distin-
guish between the harmful and the beneficial applications of cor-
porate governance practices. 
III. HOW DO GENERAL TAX RULES AFFECT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? 
 General tax rules are not corrective taxes, because they do 
not aim to encourage or discourage any particular activity. None-
theless, they have a significant influence on corporate governance 
agency problems. This part explores the effects of general tax 
rules on corporate governance, and how these rules can be used 
to reduce corporate agency costs. 
A. Corporate Income Taxation and Enforcement Efforts 
 A higher corporate tax rate increases the incentives for 
tunneling, whereas higher enforcement efforts can improve mon-
itoring and prevent diversion. Desai et al. analyze how the corporate 
tax rate and enforcement efforts affect the level of managerial di-
version.308 According to their model, “a higher tax rate increases 
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the return to theft by insiders....”309 Increased tax enforcement 
efforts also reduce the incentives for theft by insiders, as the ex-
ternal monitoring by the tax authorities deters insiders from 
stealing.310 Thus, an increase in tax enforcement efforts can in-
crease the value which the outside shareholders would receive, as 
well as the overall value of the firm.311 Governments can improve 
corporate governance outcomes by lowering the corporate income tax 
rate, especially where corporate governance is weak,312 as this would 
reduce incentives for tunneling by insiders. An increase in tax en-
forcement efforts can also benefit the government with an increase 
in tax revenues, and the outside shareholders with a reduction of 
agency costs.313 
 The positive effect of tax enforcement on corporate gover-
nance is supported by several studies. El Ghoul et al.’s study ex-
amined the impact of tax enforcement on agency problems in 
American publicly traded companies and found that a higher like-
lihood of an IRS audit lowers the equity financing costs.314 It also 
found that IRS oversight is more valuable for firms with weaker 
corporate governance.315 These findings suggest that investors 
view IRS audits as a monitoring mechanism that mitigates 
agency costs, especially for firms with problematic corporate gov-
ernance.316 Similarly, a study conducted in China found that tax 
enforcement efforts reduce agency costs and improve market per-
formance.317 In another study, Hanlon and Slemrod examined the 
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stock price reaction to news about tax aggressiveness and found 
that the stock price usually declines as a reaction to news regarding 
the involvement of the firm in tax sheltering, although this mar-
ket reaction is small in comparison to reactions to other corporate 
misdeeds and accounting misrepresentations.318 The decline in 
the stock price is smaller for firms which have good corporate gov-
ernance, and this suggests that investors in these firms are less 
concerned that involvement in tax sheltering is associated with 
tunneling at the expense of shareholders.319 
 In some cases, managerial fraud actions, such as earnings 
management, result in paying corporate taxes higher than the 
amount of tax due if the earnings were reported accurately.320 Erick-
son et al. found that firms that were accused by the SEC of fraud-
ulently overstating their earnings also overpaid their taxes.321 This 
suggests that the threat of IRS monitoring caused these firms to 
overpay their taxes.322 If earnings management results in shifting 
income between periods, and the overall reported income is simi-
lar to the income that should have been reported, then the effect of 
excessive tax payments might be insignificant, as the tax pay-
ments in the following periods will be lower.323 In addition, tax au-
thorities, usually focusing on increasing tax revenues, do not have 
a strong incentive to detect incidences of inflated tax payments.324 
It is also possible that inflated tax payments are harder to detect 
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than underpayment of taxes.325 Therefore, where poor corporate gov-
ernance results in a tax payment higher than required, an increase 
in the enforcement efforts would likely not resolve this problem. 
B. Dividend Taxation 
 High dividend tax rates appear to have a negative influ-
ence on corporate governance and managerial incentives. Chetty 
and Saez contend that dividend taxation creates a deadweight loss 
because it distorts the tradeoff between dividend distribution and 
pet project investment.326 A corporate income tax does not aggravate 
the managers’ incentives to invest inefficiently in pet projects.327 
Thus, corporate income taxation is more efficient than dividend 
taxation because it does not distort the dividend distribution de-
cision as dividend tax does.328 Chetty and Saez’s analysis follows 
the results from empirical studies on the 2003 dividend tax re-
form: regular dividend payouts rose sharply after the 2003 tax cuts, 
with a stronger response in firms with many accumulated assets, 
firms whose executives own a large number of shares, and firms 
with a large shareholder serving on the board of directors.329 Chetty 
and Saez explain these findings as being consistent with an agency 
problem where a divergence between shareholders and managers 
arises in respect of perks and pet projects.330 When managers have 
stronger incentives to maximize profits for shareholders—either 
because of a higher level of incentive compensation, or because of 
a more effective monitoring by large shareholders—an increase in 
dividends is more likely in response to a tax reduction.331 
 Edwards et al. found that the combined effects of dividend 
taxation and financial reporting incentives encourage the manag-
ers of MNEs that have high levels of cash accumulated overseas 
to make less profitable cash acquisitions of foreign companies than 
MNEs with lower levels of trapped cash.332  
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 Morck and Yeung also analyze the effect of dividend taxa-
tion on corporate governance.333 Following Jensen,334 they argue 
that well-governed mature firms that generate more income than 
is needed to finance profitable investment opportunities should 
pay out their residual income, or free cash flow, as dividends.335 
However, insiders might use the free cash flow to fund their pri-
vate benefits.336 Jensen named this phenomenon the free cash 
flow agency problem.337 There is evidence which shows that many 
firms choose a level of reinvestment which is too high and that 
dividend distribution is inefficiently low.338 Moreover, there is ev-
idence that firms with stronger shareholder rights distribute 
higher dividends.339 Desai et al. found that parent companies re-
quire higher dividend payouts from subsidiaries in countries with 
lower corporate governance standards, which may indicate that 
dividends are needed to control managers of foreign affiliates.340 
Under these explanations, better corporate governance results in 
larger dividends.341 Therefore, Morck and Yeung contend that a 
high dividend tax rate is detrimental to corporate governance, be-
cause it provides managers with a reason to retain earnings rather 
than to distribute them as dividends.342 
 One consideration which supports retaining a certain level 
of taxation on dividend distribution to individuals is the incentive 
it creates for these individuals to invest through tax-exempt in-
stitutional investment entities, such as pension funds, which re-
duce the collective action problems and improve monitoring.343 
Thus, Morck and Yeung support lowering, but not eliminating, 
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individual taxation on dividends, while retaining the intercorpo-
rate dividend taxes as a means of preventing the resurgence of 
the pyramidal business groups.344 
 To conclude, the literature on corporate income taxation 
and on dividend taxation indicates that high corporate income 
and dividend tax rates have a negative influence on corporate gov-
ernance and managerial incentives. Higher enforcement efforts 
improve corporate governance by providing a more effective exter-
nal monitoring, which can benefit outside shareholders of firms 
with weak corporate governance.345 Corporate income taxation is 
superior to dividend taxation as a revenue source, because it cre-
ates fewer distortions.346 Nonetheless, a low level of dividend tax-
ation on distribution to individuals would provide them with a 
stronger incentive to invest through tax-exempt institutional in-
vestors, such as pension funds, which can mitigate the collective 
action problem and improve monitoring.347 
C. Individual Income Taxation 
 Certain individual tax rules in the United States encourage 
granting executive compensation in the form of unvested stock op-
tions, restricted stocks, and other forms of deferred compensation 
granted under future performance conditions.348 Section 83 grants 
a deferral of the tax on these forms of compensation until they are 
not subject to a “substantial risk of forfeiture.”349 However, cer-
tain performance conditions that are easily attainable are consid-
ered as creating a “substantial risk of forfeiture” for the purposes 
of this tax rule.350 The transferee can elect to be taxed on the 
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transfer earlier, but in case the transferred property is forfeited, 
the tax paid is not given back.351 The firm can deduct the cost of 
granting this property only when it is included in the taxable in-
come of the transferee.352 Where the executive is subject to a 
higher marginal tax rate than the firm, it is beneficial for both 
the firm and the executive to grant a large portion of the compen-
sation in a tax-deferred manner under this rule.353 
 The rule in section 83 is substantially different in its pur-
pose from the rule in section 162(m). The rule in section 162(m) is 
serving a non-tax purpose: namely, encouraging publicly traded 
firms to adopt performance-based compensation for their execu-
tives.354 In contrast, the purpose of the rule in section 83 is to 
measure income accurately. The rationale in this section is that 
an income should be taxed only when it is certain. If there is a 
substantial risk that the transferred property might be forfeited, 
the income is uncertain and thus should not be taxed.355 However, 
firms can adopt easily attainable performance conditions without 
a real significant risk of forfeiture, and yet still meet the require-
ments of this section. Tax authorities have significant difficulties 
in observing the actual risk of forfeiture, and thus, they have a 
limited ability to monitor whether this rule is used only when 
there is a real risk of forfeiture. Consequently, this rule creates 
an incentive for firms and executives to grant compensation in the 
form of unvested stock options and restricted stocks also when 
there is no significant risk of forfeiture. 
 As discussed above in the context of section 162(m), the ef-
fect of increasing equity-based compensation on the quality of cor-
porate governance is questionable. It appears that larger equity 
holdings of managers mitigate some of the agency problems be-
cause they better align managers’ incentives with those of share-
holders.356 However, section 83, similar to section 162(m), fails to 
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incentivize the adoption of performance-based compensation, as 
easily achievable performance goals satisfy the requirements for 
deferral under this tax rule. Moreover, the outsiders’ enthusiasm 
about equity-based compensation might enable managers to re-
ceive a higher compensation without reducing their cash compen-
sation: namely, a form of equity tunneling.357 Therefore, it appears 
that a tax rule in section 83 that encourages the use of equity-based 
compensation may affect the quality of corporate governance, but 
its full effect is unclear. 
 Individual taxation also negatively affects corporate gov-
ernance through the taxation of working condition fringe benefits. 
The tax rule in section 132 for working condition fringe benefits 
allows the deduction of some expenses by the firm, without attrib-
uting any taxable income to the employees.358 A working condi-
tion fringe is defined as “any property or services provided to an 
employee of the employer to the extent that, if the employee paid 
for such property or services, such payment would be allowable as 
a deduction[.]”359 Much of the costs of various managerial perks, 
such as expensive offices, can be deducted by the firm, while the 
managers are not taxed on the utility they derive from these 
perks. Not taxing the benefit for managers, while offering a tax 
deduction to the corporation, might increase spending on perks.360 
From the shareholders’ standpoint, providing the managers with 
tax-favored compensation is beneficial. However, creating a tax-
induced incentive to increase spending on perks might harm 
shareholders because this form of compensation is not as salient 
as other forms of executive compensation, does not require ap-
proval and reporting as such, and might not substitute for other 
forms of compensation.361 
 The lower tax rate that applies to long-term capital gains 
encourages shareholders to hold shares for at least one year.362 
The step-up in basis at the time of death also creates an incentive 
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to hold shares for a long time.363 A shareholder who holds shares 
for a longer time might have a stronger incentive to monitor the 
management, although it is questionable whether this effect indeed 
results in better monitoring. 
D. Complexity of the Tax Rules 
 Tax rules undoubtedly add complexity to corporate struc-
tures and transactions. Financial statements do not disclose 
much of this complexity.364 It is also very hard to infer infor-
mation from public financial statements regarding firms’ taxable 
income.365 It is possible that this complexity can be used to dis-
guise earnings manipulation and tunneling of value from the firm 
to insiders.366 For example, “earnings manipulation was ... central 
to Enron’s extensive use of tax shelters.”367 Interestingly, some of 
the transactions that Enron made using tax shelters to inflate its 
financial income suffered from high transaction costs and fees 
while not generating significant tax benefits.368 The tax-driven 
complexity of many corporate structures and transactions in-
creases the cost of monitoring of outsiders on actions taken by the 
management.369 Transfer of assets between related companies, 
which can be explained as tax-driven transactions, can provide 
managers and controllers with tunneling opportunities.370 There-
fore, simplifying and harmonizing tax rules would likely reduce 
corporate agency costs. 
                                                                                                                        
363 Id. § 1014. 
364 Consolidated financial statements report the aggregated assets, liabili-
ties, and performance of the firm and its controlled subsidiaries. In addition, 
there is no general reporting obligation with respect to the structure of trans-
actions. The IRS can request information on any transaction, but in most cases 
this information remains confidential. Complexity reduces the effectiveness of 
the monitoring of the IRS as well, as more resources are needed in order to 
understand complicated structures and transactions.  
365 See Michelle Hanlon, What Can We Infer about a Firm’s Taxable Income 
from Its Financial Statements?, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 831, 831 (2003). 
366 See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 19–20; Schizer, supra note 
9, at 27–28. 
367 See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 16. 
368 See id. 
369 See id. at 27. 
370 See Atanasov et al., supra note 50, at 39–40. 
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E. Location of Incorporation 
 Tax incentives may distort the international market for 
corporate charters.371 Tax-motivated corporate decisions regard-
ing the location of incorporation can lead to an efficiency cost 
where corporations choose jurisdictions that are suboptimal from 
a corporate law standpoint.372 Exit taxation may have a deterrent 
effect on firms seeking to relocate to a jurisdiction with a pre-
ferred regime of corporate law.373 In addition, as long as there is 
an overlap between corporate and tax locational rules, there might 
be a tradeoff: locations with low tax rates might be preferred even 
if they are less desirable on corporate law grounds.374 One pro-
posal suggests severing the market for corporate law from the mar-
ket for corporate tax law.375 This could be done through the global 
coordination of the locational rules for corporate law and corporate 
tax law: the “place of incorporation” rule could apply for corporate 
law purposes, and a residence test based on other factual factors 
could apply for corporate tax purposes?the “real seat” rule.376 
F. Financing 
 The tax system influences a firm’s choice between debt and 
equity. In general, debt is favored by the tax system because interest 
payments are deductible, whereas dividend payments are not de-
ductible.377 A preference to choose debt may affect corporate gov-
ernance, as debt owed to lenders could replace the equity investments 
of the minority shareholders.378 Lenders can monitor the firm’s 
governance, although a tax-induced preference for debt might in-
crease the agency problem between lenders and shareholders.379 
                                                                                                                        
371 See Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and Inter-
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372 See id. at 1230, 1233, 1273. 
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Large debt, and the prospect of bankruptcy, can motivate managers 
to perform better.380 In the context of mergers and acquisitions, 
the tax system treats these mergers differently based on their fi-
nancing, encouraging the use of equity to finance mergers.381 There 
is a need for more research on the corporate governance implica-
tions of these effects. 
G. Losses and Changes in Control 
 Section 382 limits an acquirer’s ability to use a target com-
pany’s tax losses.382 Therefore, companies with large accumulated 
tax losses that they cannot use (“net operating losses” or NOLs) 
currently have a strong tax-related reason for objecting to changes in 
ownership.383 These limits might exacerbate entrenchment, espe-
cially in companies with underperforming management.384 
IV. HOW DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT TAXATION? 
 Although this Article has focused on the effect of taxation 
on corporate governance, it is important to note that corporate 
governance practices and characteristics also influence taxation. 
Additionally, the effect of corporate governance on taxation is a 
relevant factor to consider when evaluating the current tax sys-
tem and possible reforms. 
 There is evidence that shows that a higher level of incen-
tive compensation is associated with an increased level of tax 
avoidance.385 This connection is possibly stronger among firms 
with better corporate governance.386 The ownership structure 
also affects the level of tax avoidance. For instance, family-owned 
firms and firms with a dual class stock structure have a lower 
level of tax avoidance, whereas firms, in which PE firms and hedge 
funds have large holdings, show higher levels of tax avoidance, as 
discussed below. 
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A. Impact of Incentive Compensation on Tax Avoidance 
 According to one theory, incentive compensation should 
motivate managers to reduce the diversion of rents, and to in-
crease tax avoidance activities that increase the after-tax firm value, 
because greater incentive compensation helps to better align mana-
gerial incentives with those of shareholders.387 According to a 
competing theory, complementarities between diversion and tax 
sheltering might offset the increase of after-tax value.388 If a 
higher level of tax sheltering might facilitate more managerial 
rent extraction, then corporate governance should moderate the 
relation between incentive compensation and tax sheltering.389 For 
any relationship between diversion and sheltering, firms with better 
corporate governance have lower initial diversion levels and, there-
fore, less scope for potential reduction in diversion.390 Thus, higher 
incentive compensation is predicted to result in a higher level of 
tax avoidance in firms with better corporate governance.391 
 One study found that, on average, increases in incentive 
compensation to the five highest-paid executives reduce the level 
of tax sheltering.392 This result was seen primarily in firms with 
weak corporate governance, and it did not hold for firms with 
strong corporate governance.393 This evidence suggests that there 
are complementarities between sheltering and diversion and that 
the relation between incentive compensation and sheltering is 
mediated by the strength of the firm’s corporate governance.394 
 Other studies found a positive association between higher 
levels of incentive compensation for executives and corporate tax 
avoidance. One study found that larger equity risk incentives for 
managers are associated with a higher level of corporate tax ag-
gressiveness; the same study also found that there is little evidence 
that the quality of corporate governance moderates the positive 
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relation between equity risk incentives and risky tax avoidance.395 
Another study found that when the executive compensation depends 
more on performance, the firm is more likely to get involved in tax 
planning, and that other corporate governance measures do not 
affect tax avoidance as does incentive compensation.396 Mahenthiran 
and Kasipillai analyzed the data of corporations in Malaysia and 
found that firms with high performance, and executive compensa-
tion tied with performance, are more likely to lower their effective 
tax rates through tax planning.397 Hanlon et al. found that pay-for-
performance sensitivities for the top five executives are positively 
correlated with proposed IRS audit deficiencies.398 Armstrong et 
al. found that the executives’ equity incentives and the level of tax 
avoidance are positively correlated, and that this correlation is 
stronger in the upper end of the tax-avoidance distribution.399 
                                                                                                                        
395 See Sonja Olhoft Rego & Ryan Wilson, Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate 
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399 See Christopher S. Armstrong et al., Corporate Governance, Incentives, and 
Tax Avoidance, 60 J. ACCT. & ECON. 1, 10, 15 (2015). Using quintile regression, 
they found a positive relation between the upper tail of the tax-avoidance dis-
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 Overall, although there are mixed results, many of the stud-
ies that examine the relationships between corporate governance, 
incentive compensation, and tax avoidance found that, on average, 
a higher level of incentive compensation is associated with an in-
creased tax-avoidance level. 
B. Impact of Ownership Structure on Tax Avoidance 
 Different ownership structures are associated with different 
levels of tax avoidance. One study found that family-owned firms 
have a lower level of tax avoidance relative to nonfamily-owned 
firms.400 Another study found that firms with dual class stock 
ownership engage in less tax avoidance, and that the level of tax 
avoidance is declining as the gap between voting rights and cash 
flow rights increases.401 These findings are consistent with the 
prediction that managers that are insulated from takeovers avoid 
the risks associated with taking tax-avoidance measures. The re-
sults may also support the view that managers in these firms are 
willing to forgo tax advantages to avoid concerns by noncontrol-
ling shareholders, who may fear that tax avoidance is a disguise 
for insiders’ rent extraction. 
 In addition, firms held by private equity and hedge funds show 
higher levels of tax avoidance. Badertscher et al. found that PE funds 
increase the effectiveness of tax planning for companies in which 
they invest?PE-backed firms.402 This effect is stronger for compa-
nies in which PE funds hold a majority of the stocks, and where the 
                                                                                                                        
negative relation in the lower tail of the tax-avoidance distribution. Id. at 15. 
In other words, where the board is more independent and financially sophisti-
cated, very high or very low levels of tax avoidance are less likely to be adopted. 
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investing PE funds are very large.403 Cheng et al. found that target 
firms, after hedge fund intervention, have higher tax-avoidance lev-
els in comparison to matched control firms.404 PE and hedge funds 
have strong incentives to engage in costly monitoring activities to 
improve the firms’ performance, and they can push for more efficient 
tax strategies through their enhanced monitoring.405 
 These findings should be taken into account when consid-
ering reforms which aim to reduce tax-avoidance opportunities. 
These results might indicate that eliminating tax-avoidance op-
portunities would have a stronger effect on firms with higher lev-
els of incentive compensation and firms held by PE and hedge 
funds. As mentioned above, it is possible that these are firms with 
better corporate governance, executive incentives, and monitoring. 
Eliminating tax-avoidance opportunities may encourage these 
firms to focus more on the real improvement of their performance 
instead of the improvement of their tax efficiency. However, PE 
and hedge funds might have lower incentives to invest in and im-
prove on firms with poor corporate governance because the poten-
tial return from increasing the tax-avoidance level would be gone. 
To the extent that these funds generate positive externalities, a 
more efficient and targeted approach would be to grant them a 
corrective subsidy. 
 A tax reform that would eliminate tax-avoidance opportu-
nities, reduce corporate and dividend taxes, and increase enforce-
ment efforts could possibly improve corporate governance for firms 
with weak governance. It could also provide well-governed firms 
with stronger incentives to focus more on real improvement in 
their performance rather than on enhancing their tax efficiency. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 This Article explores how tax policy can improve corporate 
governance and reduce corporate agency costs. This Article iden-
tifies the reasons for the limited effectiveness of corrective taxes 
in mitigating corporate governance inefficiencies. Policymakers 
should consider repealing section 162(m) and the tax penalty on 
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large golden parachutes, and replacing the tax on intercompany 
dividends with a ban. Proposals for corrective taxes on high exec-
utive compensation, related-party transactions, and anti-takeover 
devices should not be adopted because it is unclear whether the 
overall benefits from these proposed taxes will exceed their costs.  
The effects of general tax rules on corporate governance 
should be considered when designing a tax reform. A tax reform 
that lowers tax rates on corporate income and dividends, increases 
enforcement, and simplifies the tax system, would have a positive 
effect on the quality of corporate governance.  
